Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After the NLRB\u27s Columbia University Decision (CLE) - Handout: Columbia\u27s reply brief by unknown
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 0 National Center Proceedings 2017 Article 16
March 2017
Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective
Bargaining After the NLRB's Columbia University
Decision (CLE) - Handout: Columbia's reply brief
Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, and the Higher Education Commons
This Proceedings Material is brought to you for free and open access by The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining
in the Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2017) "Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After the NLRB's Columbia University Decision (CLE) -
Handout: Columbia's reply brief," Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy: Vol. 0 , Article 16.
Available at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/16
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
 
THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF  
NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and- 
GRADUATE WORKERS OF COLUMBIA-
GWC, UAW. 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 02-RC-143012 
 
 
 
 
REPLY BRIEF OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
1
et al.: Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After t
Published by The Keep, 2017
  
i 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
I. BROWN IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES AND PURPOSES OF 
THE ACT .............................................................................................................................2 
II. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THE BOARD RELIED ON IN 
BROWN REMAIN VALID ..................................................................................................6 
A. No Empirical Studies Disprove Brown’s Concerns .....................................7 
B. Experience at NYU and at Public Universities Has No 
Bearing on Whether Collective Bargaining with Graduate 
Students Is Detrimental to Academic Freedom or 
Student/Faculty Relationships ...................................................................10 
1. The Unique Experience at NYU Does Not Disprove Brown’s 
Concerns…………………………………………………………10 
2. Collective Bargaining in Public Universities Does Not Support 
Extending the Act to Private Universities………………………..12 
III.       INSTRUCTIONAL AND RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS SERVE THE 
            ACADEMIC AND PROFFESIONAL NEEDS OF GRADUATE STUDENTS ……….15 
 
III. GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS ARE NOT EMPLOYEES ............................19 
 
IV. MASTER’S DEGREE AND UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS ARE 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES ..........................................................................................21 
 
V. DOCTORAL STUDENTS DO NOT SHARE A COMMUNITY OF 
INTEREST WITH MASTER’S DEGREE AND UNDERGRADUATE 
STUDENTS .......................................................................................................................23  
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................25 
  
2
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 16
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/16
 ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 Page(s) 
CASES 
Adelphi Univ., 
195 NLRB 639 (1972) .........................................................................................................5, 25 
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U.S. 157 (1971) ...................................................................................................................2 
Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 
224 NLRB 1057 (1976) ...........................................................................................................22 
Ass’n of Graduate Student Employees v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
Case No. SF-Ce-17-9-H, PERB Dec. No. 730-H (April 26, 1989) ...................................14, 20 
Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 
173 NLRB 1366 (1968) ...........................................................................................................23 
Berger, et al. v. NCAA, et al., 
Case 1:14-cv-01710-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016) .......................................................3 
Berlitz Sch. of Languages, 
231 NLRB 766 (1977) .............................................................................................................22 
Boston Med. Ctr., 
330 NLRB 152 (1999) ...........................................................................................................3, 5 
Brown Univ., 
342 NLRB No. 42 ............................................................................................................ passim 
Chinatown Planning Council, Inc., 
290 NLRB 1091 (1988) .............................................................................................................6 
Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 
381 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................4 
Daniel Constr. Co., 
133 NLRB 264 (1961) .............................................................................................................23 
Firmat Mfg. Corp., 
255 NLRB 1213 (1981) .............................................................................................................6 
Gen. Motors Corp., 
133 NLRB 1063 (1961) .............................................................................................................6 
3
et al.: Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After t
Published by The Keep, 2017
 iii 
 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 
791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015).......................................................................................................3 
Goddard Coll., 
216 NLRB 457 (1975) .............................................................................................................22 
Graduate Emps. Org. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 
315 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1st Dist. 2000) .......................................................................................14 
The Grand, 
197 NLRB 1105 (1972) ...........................................................................................................24 
Hondo Drilling Co., 
164 NLRB 416 (1967) .............................................................................................................23 
Kansas City Repertory Theatre, Inc., 
356 NLRB No. 28 (2010) ........................................................................................................23 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
214 NLRB 621 (1974) .............................................................................................4, 19, 20, 21 
New York Univ., 
332 NLRB 1205 (2000) ................................................................................................... passim 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 
57 NLRB 1053 (1944) ...............................................................................................................6 
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 
516 U.S. 85 (1995) .....................................................................................................................2 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 
313 U.S. 177 (1941) ...................................................................................................................2 
Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 
101 NLRB 1005 (1952) ...........................................................................................................23 
Research Found. of the State Univ. of N.Y. Office of Sponsored Programs, 
350 NLRB 197 (2007) .............................................................................................................21 
San Francisco Art Inst., 
226 NLRB No. 204 (1976) ......................................................................................................24 
Seattle Opera Ass’n, 
331 NLRB 1072 (2000) .............................................................................................................2 
Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 
642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................3 
4
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 16
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/16
 iv 
 
St. Barnabas Hosp., 
355 NLRB No. 39 (2010) ..........................................................................................................3 
Sunland Constr. Co., 
309 NLRB 1224 (1992) .............................................................................................................2 
Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 
467 U.S. 883 (1984) ...................................................................................................................2 
Town of Danvers,  
3 MLC 1559 (1977) .................................................................................................................13 
Towne Chevrolet, 
230 NLRB 479 (1977) ...............................................................................................................6 
Trs. of Stevens Inst. of Tech., 
222 NLRB 16 (1976) ...............................................................................................................22 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 
306 NLRB 294 (1992) .............................................................................................................21 
Univ. Educ. Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 
353 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1984).................................................................................................13 
Univ. of Iowa/State Bd. of Regents v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine 
Workers of America, Local 896, 
Case No. 5463 (May 6, 1996) ..................................................................................................14 
WBAI Pacifica Found., 
328 NLRB 1273 (1999) .............................................................................................................2 
Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., 
355 NLRB 637 (2010) .............................................................................................................24 
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) .........................................................................................................................5 
Cal. Gov. Code § 3562(e) ..............................................................................................................14 
California’s Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act ..............................................14 
Fair Labor Standards Act .............................................................................................................2, 3 
Michigan Consol. Laws § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (2014) .....................................................................13 
National Labor Relations Act ..........................................................................................................1 
RCW 41.56.203 .............................................................................................................................13 
5
et al.: Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After t
Published by The Keep, 2017
 v 
 
Andrew Gross, Campus Union Coalitions and the Corporate University: 
Organizing at the University of California ..............................................................................10 
Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts 
and Consequences, 26 REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUC. No. 2 (2002) ......................................9 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35-36 (1947) .......................................................5 
Jenny J. Lee et al., Tangles in the Tapestry: Cultural Barriers to Graduate 
Student Unionization, 75(3) .................................................................................................9, 10 
Restatement (Third) of the Law, Employment, § 102, comment g (2014) ......................................4 
Vermont St. Title 3, Chap. 27 § 903 ..............................................................................................13 
 
 
 
6
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 16
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/16
  
1 
 
 
Petitioner and its amici disagree with Brown but do little more than recycle the arguments 
of the dissent in that case.  In particular, they urge the Board to ignore the sound policy reasons 
for not imposing an inherently adversarial bargaining obligation on the collaborative, academic 
relationship between graduate students and the private universities they attend.  To accomplish 
that result, Petitioner and its amici insist that the Board apply a rigid, common law test that 
would classify graduate assistants as employees simply because they, at times, provide services 
to the university in exchange for “compensation.”   
No evidence of a change in circumstances, legal precedent, or any other change is offered 
to support Brown’s reversal.  Petitioner presented no evidence or argument to support the 
employee status of graduate assistants that was not available when Brown was decided.  As was 
true then, graduate students attend school to pursue academic and professional goals – not to earn 
a paycheck.  Nothing in the record alters the plain reality that the relationship between graduate 
student and university is primarily educational rather than economic, and that it thus should not 
be governed by the National Labor Relations Act.  Columbia’s conclusion in this regard is shared 
by our nation’s leading universities, and by the most important academic professional 
associations.1 
                                                 
1 See Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard 
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton 
University, Stanford University, Yale University; Amici Curiae Brief of the American Council 
on Education, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of American 
Universities, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, the College and University 
Professional Association for Human Resources and the National Association of Independent 
Colleges and Universities; Amicus Brief by the Higher Education Council of the Employment 
Law Alliance; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Right to Work Legal Defense and 
Education Foundation. 
7
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I. BROWN IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES AND PURPOSES OF THE 
ACT 
Determination of employee status under the Act cannot be based on a mechanical 
application of statutory language, especially given the tautological nature of the language at 
issue.  In Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 
U.S. 157 (1971), which held that retired employees are not “employees” within the meaning of 
Section 2(3), the Court explained that “[i]n doubtful cases resort must still be had to economic 
and policy considerations to infuse § 2(3) with meaning.”  Id. at 168.  The Board has similarly 
recognized “the principle that employee status must be determined against the background of the 
policies and purposes of the Act.”  WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 NLRB 1273, 1275 (1999).  
Indeed, even the cases cited by Petitioner and its amici support this principle.  See, e.g.  NLRB v. 
Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995) (Board’s interpretation of “employee” to include 
company workers who are also paid union organizers is consistent with the purposes of the Act); 
Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (extending the Act’s coverage to undocumented 
aliens is consistent with its purpose of encouraging and protecting the collective bargaining 
process); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (examining the policies of the Act 
in considering employee status of strikers); Sunland Constr. Co., 309 NLRB 1224 (1992) 
(analyzing whether protecting paid union organizers as “employees” furthers the policies of Act); 
Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 NLRB 1072, 1074 (2000) (finding an economic relationship between 
an opera company and auxiliary choristers; “to find individuals not to be employees because they 
are compensated at less than the minimum wage . . . contravenes the stated principles of the 
Act”).  
Brown’s focus on the primary nature of the relationship to determine employee status is 
consistent with cases interpreting the closely analogous definition of “employee” under the Fair 
8
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Labor Standards Act – cases which Petitioner and its amici fail to address at all.  As explained in 
Columbia’s Brief on Review, the “primary benefit” test adopted by courts to determine employee 
status under the FLSA provides strong support for the “primary relationship” test adopted in 
Brown.  Columbia Br. at 19-20.  Specifically, to determine the employee status under the FLSA 
of interns and trainees, courts have rejected the kind of simple, mechanical test urged upon the 
Board here in favor of a nuanced, flexible standard that considers and balances various factors.  
See id. (citing Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015), amended and 
superseded, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 
518, 526 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also Berger, et al. v. NCAA, et al., Case 1:14-cv-01710-WTL-MJD 
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016) (applying the “totality of circumstances” and the “economic reality of 
the situation” test to determine that students participating in NCAA athletic teams at the 
University of Pennsylvania as part of their overall educational program are not employees for 
FLSA purposes).  
Petitioner continues to rely on Boston Medical Center, 330 NLRB 152 (1999), the 
inapplicability of which Columbia has already addressed.  Columbia Br. at 29-30.  Remarkably, 
Petitioner asserts that the Board should revert to New York University, 332 NLRB 1205 (2000) 
(“NYU I”), because Boston Medical “has not been questioned by the courts of appeals” and NYU 
I is consistent with Boston Medical.  Pet. Br. at 17-18.  But neither has Brown been questioned 
by courts of appeals, and it is Brown that directly applies to graduate student assistants at private 
universities.  Indeed, because there are significant differences between the house staff in Boston 
Medical and graduate student assistants, see St. Barnabas Hosp., 355 NLRB No. 39 (2010), 
Brown’s consistency (or inconsistency) with Boston Medical is irrelevant.   
The interpretation of “employee” in the Restatement of Employment Law fails to support 
9
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the use of a mechanical common law test to determine whether graduate students are employees.  
The portion of the Restatement Petitioner relied on, Pet. Br. at 16, is based on Cuddeback v. Fla. 
Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2004), a Title VII case which applied the “economic 
realities test” to determine employee status.  The court found that a number of factors weighed in 
favor of treating a research assistant as a student, including the fact that much of her work was 
done to satisfy the lab-work, publication and dissertation requirements of her graduate program.  
Id. at 1234.  The court found, however, that these factors were outweighed by other facts 
demonstrating that the university treated her as an employee.  Most significantly, plaintiff was 
considered an employee under applicable state law and was already covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement that governed her employment relationship and provided for a stipend, 
sick leave and other employee benefits.  Id.  The facts here are completely different, and the 
significance of Cuddeback is not the outcome after the court weighed the factors, but the 
recognition that, to determine the employee status of a student, the overall facts must be balanced 
in the context of the statutory purpose.2   
Petitioner asserts that the definition of “professional employee” discloses “the 
understanding of Congress that student employees working in an advanced intellectual field 
would be treated as employees in the same fashion as apprentice tradespeople.”  Pet. Br. at 20.  
The Act defines a “professional employee” as  
[A]ny employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual 
instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is 
performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify 
himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). 
                                                 
2 The notes to comment g in the Restatement also state that the NLRB has vacillated on the 
employee status of graduate students, citing Brown and NYU I.  Restatement (Third) of the Law, 
Employment, § 102, comment g (2014).  While true as to graduate teaching assistants, this 
statement does not reflect the fact that, for almost forty years, the Board has treated research 
assistants as not employees under Leland Stanford and NYU I. 
10
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29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(b) (emphasis added).  Clause (iv) refers to: 
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily 
acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in 
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general 
academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance 
of routine mental, manual, or physical processes. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a). 
The conference report states that “[t]his definition in general covers such persons as legal, 
engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants.”  
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35-36 (1947).  The interns and residents in 
Boston Medical who already received their advanced academic degrees and were pursuing 
further training after graduation seem to meet that definition.  Indeed, in Boston Medical, the 
Board expressly noted that residents are “junior professional associates” of regular physicians 
who “possess the types of skills and are required to perform the types of job duties common to 
other physicians, at similar, albeit not identical, skill levels.”  330 NLRB at 161, 167.  In 
contrast, graduate student assistants are still enrolled in academic programs to receive their 
degrees, and thus do not come within that definition.  Not only are they performing teaching and 
research required to fulfill their doctoral degrees, but they pay tuition and student fees, register 
for classes, take tests, receive grades for their teaching and research and have all the attributes of 
students in a traditional academic setting.  Graduate assistants typically work under close 
supervision of faculty members who are ultimately responsible for the students’ teaching or 
research.  As such, they are neither apprentices nor junior professional associates, and they 
certainly are not “professional employees.”  Indeed, the Board has never included these students 
in the same bargaining unit as faculty.  See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 NLRB 639 (1972). 
Notably, Petitioner’s argument that Brown is inconsistent with precedent finding 
apprentices to be employees relies on cases distinguished or deemed not relevant in Brown.  Pet. 
11
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Br. at 19 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 57 NLRB 1053 (1944); 
Chinatown Planning Council, Inc., 290 NLRB 1091 (1988); Gen. Motors Corp., 133 NLRB 
1063 (1961)).  These cases involved apprentices who received on-the-job training performing the 
same work in the same workplace as regular employees, with the goal of being promoted to 
“journeyman” or a similar senior position, as soon as they gained the necessary technical 
competence.  In contrast to apprentices, teaching and research assistants work on their own 
educational programs within the setting of a large educational institution and are almost always 
seeking employment after graduation with outside employers, whether in the private sector or 
academia.  There is no expectation of future employment by the same school in which they are 
enrolled.     
Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, even in apprenticeship cases, the Board 
examines whether the relationship is predominantly educational or economic, and has found 
apprentices not to be employees under the Act where the relationship was predominantly 
educational.  See Towne Chevrolet, 230 NLRB 479 (1977) (student working for a company as 
part of a vocational-training program had more of an educational than an employment 
relationship with employer); Firmat Mfg. Corp., 255 NLRB 1213 (1981) (student working 
pursuant to high school education apprenticeship program had an educational rather than 
employment relationship with employer due to educational focus of the position). 
II. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THE BOARD RELIED ON IN BROWN 
REMAIN VALID 
Petitioner and its amici misconstrue what is at stake in this case and make the absurd 
contention that the “fear that collective bargaining would damage educational institutions is born 
out of the imagination of those hostile to collective bargaining.”  Pet. Br. at 24.  Columbia has 
for many years maintained successful collective bargaining relationships with more than a dozen 
12
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 16
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/16
 7 
 
bargaining units.  Columbia is not a stranger to, and certainly has no fear of or hostility to 
collective bargaining.  But that deep familiarity forms the basis for its belief, shared by its amici, 
that given the nature, purpose, and quality of graduate education at private universities, the 
Brown Board correctly recognized the detrimental impact that collective bargaining would have 
on academic freedom and on student/faculty relations.   
Even assuming that no empirical evidence of the deleterious effect of collective 
bargaining on academic freedom and student/faculty relations exists, there is no justification for 
tampering with our system of graduate education in private universities by imposing the 
inherently adversarial rules that govern collective bargaining on academic relationships.  Surely, 
it is not necessary to wait for the assault to be realized to appreciate the threat.  There simply is 
no reason to “take these risks with our nation’s excellent private educational system.”  Brown, 
342 NLRB at 493. 
A. No Empirical Studies Disprove Brown’s Concerns 
Petitioner relies, as expected, on the Rogers study to suggest that it “contradicts the 
conjecture by the Brown majority.”  Pet. Br. at 28.  In its Brief on Review, Columbia explained 
why that study provides no support for Petitioner’s claim.  Columbia Br. at 27-28; see also Br. of 
Amici Curiae Brown University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, 
Stanford University, Yale University (“Ivy Plus”) at 6.  It bears emphasis that the study 
completely ignored the concern in Brown that graduate student unionization would restrict the 
freedom of faculty and administration to make academic and educational decisions.  See Brown, 
342 NLRB at 490.  The study focused only on students, not faculty.  See Empl. Ex. 81 at 495.3  
                                                 
3 The questionnaire used in the study asked students questions, such as “As long as I restrict 
myself to the subject matter of the course, I am free to choose what I say or discuss with students 
13
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As faculty did not participate at all, the study provides no basis for any conclusion about 
academic freedom from the perspective of faculty or university administration.  Tr. 558-59 
(Farber).  Moreover, as Dr. Farber pointed out, the study found no evidence that student-teacher 
relations were not worse in the context of graduate student representation, or that unionization 
would not have an adverse effect on these relationships at private universities.  Indeed, to the 
extent that the study found any differences in the responses between union and non-union 
students, these differences were measured so imprecisely that they reflect no more than the 
difference in responses that one would find in the population as a whole.  Tr. 552-54.   
The Rogers study also failed to analyze the underlying cause of any differences in student 
responses.  It only looked at each university at a single point in time.  As Dr. Farber explained, 
this flaw, which applies across the board to the results relating to student/faculty relations and 
students’ perception of academic freedom, results in attribution of the differences (or the lack of 
differences) to the effect or the fact of unionization, when those differences could have been 
caused by a myriad of other, unexplored factors.  Tr. 545-46, 551; see Tr. 560 (the design of the 
study “can’t get you to a causal inference that unions caused the difference or didn’t cause the 
difference”).   
Finally, the Rogers study did not examine laboratory sciences students at all – they, like 
faculty, were simply not included.  Empl. Ex. 81 at 499, 508; see Tr. 564.  As students in 
different departments may have widely varying attitudes toward unionization, and different 
departments may be larger in different schools, the study cannot even claim to be relevant to the 
hundreds of Columbia science students who hold research assistant positions.  As Dr. Farber 
concluded, one cannot “learn anything at all from this study[,] one way or the other – good or 
                                                                                                                                                             
in my courses.”  Empl. Ex. 81 at 503. 
14
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bad – about what would happen at Columbia were graduate students to unionize.”  Tr. 565; see 
Tr. 543-44.   
 Dr. Hewitt’s study (which was available when Brown was decided) is also of little value.  
In Dr. Farber’s opinion, one cannot draw a single conclusion from the study because it does not 
evaluate any relevant variations in subjects.  Tr. 566-67.  Dr. Hewitt’s study simply asked 
professors in five schools where graduate students are already unionized for their thoughts on 
collective bargaining and whether they think they have good relationships with students.  Tr. 
566.  To the extent that the study tries to draw the kind of conclusions that the Rogers study 
attempts to draw, it suffers from the same weaknesses.  Tr. 566-67.  Indeed, Dr. Hewitt’s study 
concludes only that “it looks like they have pretty good relationships, and things are going 
okay.”  Tr. 566. 
The studies cited by amici Individual Academic Professors of Social Science and Labor 
Studies are similarly inapposite.  Br. at 3.  The Julius and Gumport study, cited by the dissent in 
Brown, did not address the effect of unionization on academic freedom.  Daniel J. Julius & 
Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REVIEW 
OF HIGHER EDUC. No. 2, 187 (2002).  With respect to student/teacher relationships, the 
study’s results are ambiguous and ambivalent, finding “no conclusive evidence that collective 
bargaining in and of itself has compromised the student-faculty relationship in general or 
resulted in faculty unwillingness to serve as mentors.”  Id. at 201; see id. at 203.   
The Lee study focused on one public research university and examined barriers to 
graduate student unionization and how those barriers can be understood from a cultural 
perspective.  Jenny J. Lee et al., Tangles in the Tapestry: Cultural Barriers to Graduate Student 
Unionization, Journal of Higher Education, 75(3): 340-361.  In stating that the faculty did not 
15
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“perceive their interactions with students as being negatively affected by unionization,” the study 
relies on Professor Hewitt’s findings.  Id. at 356.  To the extent the study claims that “graduate 
students did not feel that unionization negatively affected their relationships with their 
professors,” the study suffers from the same flaw as the Rogers study – it provides only the 
students’ perspective.  Id. at 355.4   
B. Experience at NYU and at Public Universities Has No Bearing on Whether 
Collective Bargaining with Graduate Students Is Detrimental to Academic 
Freedom or Student/Faculty Relationships 
1. The Unique Experience at NYU Does Not Disprove Brown’s Concerns 
The experience at NYU amply demonstrates the negative impact of collective bargaining 
between a private university and its graduate assistants.  As explained in Columbia’s Brief on 
Review, the NYU experience underscores Brown’s conclusion that collective bargaining in this 
context is not compatible either with academic freedom or with the type of student/faculty 
relationship that is at the core of graduate education.  Columbia Br. at 25-26; see also Ivy Plus 
Br. at 6.   
Remarkably, Petitioner contends that the NYU Senate Committees’ report is “[d]irectly 
contrary to at least one of the assumptions underlying Brown” and that “unionization had been 
positive for the student/faculty relationship.”  Pet. Br. at 27.  This gross distortion of the report is 
accomplished by presenting only selected, one sided comments included by the report’s authors 
to reflect the diversity of opinion on campus, rather than the actual conclusions of the report.   
                                                 
4 The Gross study is not actually a study, but an essay of a former student reflecting on his 
experience as a graduate student assistant during an organizing drive at University of California-
Davis and as a postdoctoral teaching fellow during a campus strike.  Andrew Gross, Campus 
Union Coalitions and the Corporate University: Organizing at the University of California.  
Like the opinions expressed by amici Individual Professors of Social Science and Labor Studies, 
it is of little value in this case because it is based on personal experiences, with no context and no 
ability for testing. 
16
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Petitioner simply ignores numerous comments that focused on the negative impact of 
unionization: 
 Recruitment (“I do not think union representation in its current form does 
anything good for our [recruitment] efforts . . .  My view is that anything 
that hurts our competitiveness as a Ph.D. program and stifles our ability to 
adapt in the long run hurts students most, by decreasing the value of their 
degree”  Empl. Ex. 21 at 9-10;  
 The quality of the student/faculty relationship (“some faculty feel less 
comfortable about their communications with TAs and RAs,” “the 
relationship has been hurt,” “unionization establishes too much rigidity,” 
and “now some faculty are concerned about major problems, and want 
official involvement.”  Empl. Ex. 21 at 10; and  
 “I do not believe union representation in its current form agrees with the 
ideals the university supports;” “a tension between the values of an 
industrial union and of a research university . . . [a] tension over the nature 
of a graduate assistantship . . . [which for us] is a form of financial aid”  
Empl. Ex. 21 at 11.   
Similarly, the Faculty Advisory Committee, as a whole committee, concluded “that a 
traditional employee/employer relationship should not be at the core of students’ relationship 
with the university; educational and intellectual matters are.”  Empl. Ex. 20 at 1. 
Most important, both Committees’ reports unequivocally concluded that it was in the best 
interests of the University to withdraw recognition from the union.  Empl. Ex. 21 at 11; Empl. 
Ex. 20 at 2.  The Senate Committees’ report’s determination to withdraw recognition was 
explicitly premised on the “realities and risks to maintenance of the University’s management 
rights and academic decision making . . . .”  Empl. Ex. 21 at 11.  Similarly, the Faculty Advisory 
Committee concluded that “it is too risky to the future academic progress of NYU for it to have 
graduate assistants represented by a union that has exhibited little sensitivity to academic values 
and traditions.”  Empl. Ex. 20 at 2.  There can be no doubt that both faculty reports found that 
graduate student unionization at NYU presented a real threat to its academic mission. 
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Moreover, as Columbia explained in its brief, NYU’s recent recognition of UAW does 
not raise the policy concerns at issue in this case because NYU has restructured its doctoral 
programs to eliminate any requirement to teach, and instead separately compensates students 
who choose to teach as adjunct faculty.  Columbia Br. at 26-27.  As the teaching done by NYU 
teaching assistants is no longer required as part of the academic program, the relationship with 
students in their capacity as teachers is significantly different from that at Columbia. 
Finally, with respect to this point, Petitioner notes that NYU’s CBA with the union 
included language excluding academic matters from collective bargaining.  Pet. Br. at 26.  To the 
extent Petitioner suggests that academic freedom could be protected by such language, it 
assumes other unions would agree to similar language.  It also assumes that a union would not 
challenge or have a vastly different interpretation of that or other agreed upon language.  To the 
contrary, the union at NYU filed numerous grievances and arbitrations challenging the academic 
autonomy of the university.  NYU’s success in defending against these challenges hardly 
disproves Brown’s conclusion that academic freedom is threatened, and suggests instead that the 
student/faculty relationship will be irretrievably altered by the fact that, once collective 
bargaining is permitted, adversarial dispute resolution procedures become the norm.5 
2. Collective Bargaining in Public Universities Does Not Support 
Extending the Act to Private Universities 
Echoing the dissent in Brown, Petitioner relies on collective bargaining at public 
universities as “evidence that fears that collective bargaining will damage higher education are 
                                                 
5 As Columbia’s amici Ivy Plus universities aptly point out, the “real issue is not whether a 
particular union or university will concede certain issues in bargaining; the issue is whether they 
have to, what are the consequences if they do not, and whether, as at NYU, a union will 
challenge language it agreed to.”  Ivy Plus Br. at 18 n.21.  Indeed, “[g]iven the experience of 
NYU, it is a near certainty that the advent of bargaining with graduate students will irrevocably 
damage graduate education in the private sector, and potentially undergraduate education as 
well.”  Id. at 16. 
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unrealistic.”  Pet. Br. at 24.  The majority in Brown correctly explained why this public sector 
experience is irrelevant.  342 NLRB at 493.  Similarly, Columbia explained that, in this context, 
private universities cannot be compared to public universities.  Columbia Br. at 27; see also Ivy 
Plus Br. at 18.  This is because almost every state prohibits or restricts strikes by public 
employees.  See, e.g., Vermont St. Title 3, Chap. 27 § 903.  In some states, the scope of 
bargaining over employees enrolled in an academic program is restricted, see, e.g., RCW 
41.56.203, while in others state law defines managerial rights which are not subject to 
bargaining.  See, e.g., Town of Danvers, 3 MLC 1559, 1571 (1977) (Massachusetts Labor 
Relations Commission).  Similarly, some state courts have limited the list of bargainable 
subjects.  See Univ. Educ. Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 353 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1984).  
Thus, state laws significantly mitigate the risks that concerned the Board in Brown while no 
similar checks and balances exist in the private sector.   
Even if the Board looks to the public sector for guidance, however, it will find that many 
states which permit bargaining by graduate teaching assistants at public universities nevertheless 
exclude research assistants from bargaining either entirely or where, (as here), research assistants 
perform research that is primarily related to their education.   
In Michigan, for example, state law explicitly excludes “individual[s] serving as a 
graduate student research assistant or in an equivalent position” from participating in collective 
bargaining.   See Michigan Consol. Laws § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (2014).  Similarly, in Iowa, the 
Public Employment Relations Board excluded “Research Assistants . . . whose appointments are 
(a) primarily a means of financial aid which do not require the individuals to provide services to 
the University, or (b) which are primarily intended as learning experiences which contribute to 
the students’ progress toward their graduate or professional program of study or (c) for which the 
19
et al.: Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After t
Published by The Keep, 2017
 14 
 
students receive academic credit.”  Univ. of Iowa/State Bd. of Regents v. United Electrical, Radio 
& Machine Workers of America, Local 896 (COGS), Case No. 5463, (May 6, 1996).  A similar 
exclusion exists in Illinois and California.  See Graduate Emps. Org. v. Illinois Educ. Labor 
Relations Bd., 315 Ill. App. 3d 278, 285 (1st Dist. 2000) (the proper test is a “significant 
connection test,” whose proper application “will exclude from organizing those graduate students 
whose work is so related to their academic roles that collective bargaining would be detrimental 
to the educational process.”); Cal. Gov. Code § 3562(e) (“The board may find student employees 
whose employment is contingent on their status as students are employees only if the services 
they provide are unrelated to their educational objectives, or that those educational objectives are 
subordinate to the services they perform and that coverage under this chapter would further the 
purposes of this chapter.”); Ass’n of Graduate Student Employees v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
Case No. SF-Ce-17-9-H, PERB Dec. No. 730-H at 48 (April 26, 1989) (Graduate student 
instructors and graduate student researchers are not entitled to collective bargaining rights under 
California’s Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act). 
Contrary to the assertion in the amicus American Association of University Professors 
(“AAUP”) brief, AAUP Br. at 25, the recent voluntary agreement between NYU and the UAW 
expressly excludes research assistants in the hard sciences and the Engineering School.  Pet. Ex. 
47 at 2 (excluding “research assistants at [the School of Engineering], research assistants in the 
Biology, Chemistry, Neural Science, Physics, Mathematics, Computer Science and Psychology 
departments”). 
 In sum, Petitioner offered no evidence to disprove Brown’s concerns about how ill-suited 
collective bargaining is to the relationship between a private university and its graduate 
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assistants.  Nor has it shown any changed circumstances to justify reversing Brown.6   
III. INSTRUCTIONAL AND RESEARCH ASSITANTSHIPS SERVE THE 
ACADEMIC AND PROFFESIONAL NEEDS OF GRADUATE STUDENTS 
Petitioner presents a simplistic model unrelated to the realities of graduate education at 
Columbia and similar universities, and ignores or distorts facts to support its contention that 
academic aspects of graduate assistantships can somehow be divorced from their employment 
aspects.  Columbia’s and its amici’s briefs demonstrate, however, that graduate education at 
private universities like Columbia is much more complex and nuanced, and that, while some 
aspects of instructional and research appointments resemble employment, those aspects are 
inseparable from the universities’ overriding purpose of enhancing the education and 
development of students who pursue doctoral degrees.  See Columbia Br. at 3-12; Ivy Plus Br. at 
1-3; Br. of American Council on Education et al. (“ACE”) at 9. 
Petitioner’s assertion that the teaching and research requirements are tied to funding, not 
academics, Pet. Br. at 5-6, simply is not supported by the record.  These academic requirements 
are not limited to students who accept University funding.  The University requires all graduate 
students in GSAS Ph.D. programs to fulfill a one-year instructional requirement.  Empl. Ex. 28; 
Tr. 281-82, 754, 815.  Similarly, the University requires that all doctoral students create and 
defend a dissertation, a piece of original research and exposition.  Tr. 271, 752.  Contrary to 
Petitioner’s assertion, students teach and conduct research not “in order to receive their funding,” 
Pet. Br. at 5, but in order to fulfill the academic requirements of their doctoral degrees.  Tr. 412-
13; Empl. Ex. 52.  Petitioner is reading it backwards – the stipends relieve students of financial 
                                                 
6 The suggestion by amicus General Counsel of the NLRB that the expression of a desire to 
organize by graduate assistants at other private universities is a “significant development in 
industrial life . . .  warrant[ing] a reappraisal” of Brown is inapposite.  Br. at 16-17.  Neither the 
principles articulated in Brown nor the determination of employee status under the Act has 
anything to do with student desires or lack thereof for collective bargaining.    
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concerns while they are fulfilling their academic requirements; stipends are not provided as 
compensation for teaching and research.  Indeed, the only condition for receiving the Fellowship 
Package is that students make satisfactory progress toward the doctoral degree.  See, e.g., Empl. 
Ex. 24; Tr. 200, 297-98, 302, 749.7   
Because teaching is such an integral part of graduate education, Columbia takes the 
training of its graduate student teachers very seriously and has created training and supervision 
mechanisms geared specifically for that purpose.  Tr. 315-16, 322-23.  Contrary to the assertion 
of amicus AAUP, the training is not “relatively slight” and goes far beyond “ensuring that [the 
graduate students] teach competently for the sake of Columbia undergraduates whom they 
serve.”  AAUP Br. at 8.  As demonstrated by the record, the training programs, activities and 
initiatives are not tied to any specific undergraduate courses, and are designed to develop and 
enhance the general pedagogical skills of graduate students.  Tr. 426; Empl. Ex. 71.  The Teagle 
Fellows Program enables graduate student teachers to develop “reflective teaching practices and 
also to connect graduate students across disciplines with each other around issues of effective 
teaching.”  Tr. 488-89.  Similarly, the Lead Teaching Fellows Program allows select doctoral 
students to participate in discussions about teaching methods and ultimately conduct a pedagogy 
workshop or events in their home department.  Tr. 490; Empl. Ex. 71.  Through these programs, 
graduate students not only learn the skills they need to be effective teaching assistants, but also 
the skills they need to be future faculty.  Tr. 315. 
                                                 
7 Petitioner mischaracterizes Professor Pinkham’s testimony by suggesting that students 
supported on NSF fellowships are excused from teaching because they are not supported by 
University funds.  Pet. Br. at 5 (citing Tr. 216-17).  As Professor Pinkham testified, the NSF 
requires that its recipients “not do any teaching” for two semesters while they are supported on a 
two- to three-year NSF grant.  Tr. 217.  And as Professor Pinkham further testified, students 
supported by such teaching-restricting grants still have a teaching obligation.  Id. 
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Petitioner further contends that academic status can be separated from an economic 
relationship because students are evaluated on their performance and may be subject to discipline 
for failing to fulfill their duties.  Pet. Br. at 12.  The contention illustrates petitioner’s refusal to 
acknowledge that, in its dealings with graduate assistants, a university like Columbia is not an 
employer managing a conventional workplace.  Faculty members observe student instructors and 
provide feedback in order to enhance the students’ education and pedagogical skills, not to assess 
“job performance” or determine whether discipline is appropriate.  If a graduate student’s 
teaching is ineffective, the University will intervene to provide training and resources.  Tr. 187, 
314-16, 470-71; Empl. Ex. 40.   
Petitioner’s assertion that “[t]eaching assignments and duties for [teaching fellows] are 
determined by the academic needs of the departments or programs where they perform their 
duties” is belied by the record and misunderstands the purpose of the instructional requirement.  
Pet. Br. at 33.  As Dean Alonso testified, teaching responsibilities are determined “based on the 
pedagogical and academic needs of the training that the department is trying to give the student.”  
Tr. 302; see Tr. 307 (“[T]he particular responsibilities . . . will be determined by the ways in 
which the faculty thinks would be best to train this student to teach.”); see also Tr. 308.  Thus, 
some students only hold office hours; others lead discussion sections; others essentially teach a 
class.  Tr. 302, 307-08.  Doctoral students in the Teaching Scholars Program, for example, teach 
a course of their own creation based on the student’s dissertation topic.  Tr. 429-434; Empl. Exs. 
58; 61-64.  The pedagogical experience, regardless of the subject taught, serves the educational 
goals of the students.  For instance, Roosevelt Montas, the Director of the Core Curriculum, 
served as a Preceptor at Columbia in the Literature Humanities course of the Core Curriculum 
while studying for his Ph.D. in English.  Tr. 166.  Professor Montas described his own 
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experience teaching as “intellectually formative,” and testified that his service as a Preceptor was 
“where [he] learned to speak authoritatively about text and how to get underneath the surface of 
the text and kind of uncover its architecture and how it deploys meaning.”  Tr. 166.  Professor 
Montas “found the voice” for his dissertation while serving as a preceptor.  Tr. 166; Joint Ex. 12, 
at ¶ 7.  By teaching, students of course contribute to the mission of the University, but the 
purpose of the instructional requirement is to enhance and complement the students’ educational 
experience.  The benefits students receive far outweigh any advantage the University receives 
from student-performed teaching.  
We note that the University does not assign students to teach courses to alleviate the 
faculty’s burden or minimize its expenses.  Indeed, the stipend received by graduate students 
exceeds, by a significant margin, the replacement cost of the services provided by those students.  
Adjunct professors can be retained for a cost of approximately $6,625 per course (including 
salary and fringe benefits).  Tr. 605-06; Empl. Ex. 84.  Thus, if Columbia sought to minimize its 
expenses, it could save substantially by hiring adjuncts to provide the services performed by 
teaching assistants.  Tr. 304-05.  Similarly, the stipend for a first year graduate research assistant 
is approximately the same as the cost of hiring a postdoctoral researcher who has already 
received his or her Ph.D. training and degree and requires far less supervision than a graduate 
student.  Tr. 1022-23.  Columbia chooses to appoint graduate students to perform these services, 
despite the cost, precisely because of the value to the students and Columbia’s commitment to 
discharge its mission of training the next generation of academics.  Id.; Tr. 271, 1021.8 
                                                 
8 Similarly, amici Ivy Plus universities do not consider the value of the services provided by the 
students or the cost to replace those services in establishing stipends.  Ivy Plus Br. at 9-10.  
Rather, “[t]he ‘value proposition’ in these institutions is ‘what is the educational value of the 
experience?” not, ‘what is the lowest cost to teach each undergraduate?”  Id. at 10. 
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Most importantly, Petitioner and its amici fail to recognize that it is simply not possible to 
separate “academic” from “employment” issues at universities like Columbia, which require 
students to teach and conduct research as a condition of obtaining a doctoral degree, and where 
the evidence of the student’s work is part of the academic record.  See Columbia Br. at 3-12; Ivy 
Plus Br. at 1-3.  As recognized by the Board in Brown, where graduate students have research 
and teaching responsibilities as “part and parcel” of their academic programs, students cannot be 
treated as employees under the Act.  Other schools, like NYU and many public universities, 
choose to structure their graduate programs differently, so the Board’s reconsideration of Brown 
needs to take account of these differences, and to decide this petition on the facts of this case. See 
Ivy Plus Br. at 3; ACE Br. at 7, 21-23. 
IV. GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS ARE NOT EMPLOYEES  
Petitioner asserts that the parties agree that, “if Brown is overruled, then the Unit should 
include employees in research positions as well as those who provide instructional services.”  
Pet. Br. at 2.  Columbia rejects that assertion.  As demonstrated in Columbia’s Brief on Review, 
graduate research assistants are not employees under the Act even if Brown is reversed.  
Columbia Br. at 32-37; Columbia Post-Hearing Br. at 64.  Leland Stanford and NYU I, not 
Brown, held that research assistants in science departments are not employees because they 
perform research that is inseparable from that required to complete their dissertations.  See 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 NLRB 621, 621-22 (1974); New York Univ., 332 NLRB 1205, 
1220-21 (2000).  Thus, research assistants can be included in a bargaining unit with teaching 
assistants only if the Board also overrules Leland Stanford.  
Amicus General Counsel of the NLRB suggests that NYU I and Leland Stanford “appear 
to have involved exceptional situations unlikely to recur with much frequency.”  Br. of General 
Counsel at 21.  Simply put, there is no basis for that contention; indeed, the situation in this case 
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is precisely the same as it was in those earlier decisions.  As the General Counsel notes, the 
Regional Director in this case found that graduate research assistants “are compensated out of 
income from an external grant which has been awarded to the University for a project overseen 
by a lead faculty member,” and that the University “requires that the [graduate research 
assistant]’s work on a grant must both fulfill conditions of the research project” and ultimately 
relate to a dissertation.  Id.  These are the exact facts present in both Leland Stanford and NYU I.  
The research assistants in those cases were not at all “exceptional;” they performed the same 
responsibilities as research assistants at Columbia and at other Ivy League and similar 
institutions.  See Ivy Plus Br. at 22 (“The Leland Stanford description of [research assistants] is 
characteristic of research assistants at amici institutions.”).9  There has been no significant 
change in the past forty-two years in the structure of research grants and the role of research 
assistants who work on those grants.   
In NYU I, graduate research assistants “in certain science departments . . . receive[d] 
stipends from monies derived from external faculty research grants.”  332 NLRB at 1214.  
Students “classified as [research assistants] in these departments [were] performing the research 
required for their dissertation[s], which is the same research for which the professor has obtained 
an outside grant.”  Id.  Similarly, in Leland Stanford, graduate research assistants received 
support from a combination of sources including contracts or grants from the government or a 
third party or endowment income or other money, and were “required to engage in research . . . 
[a]s part of the course of instruction, a part of the learning process.”  214 NLRB at 622. 
                                                 
9 See also Ass’n of Graduate Student Employees v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Case No. SF-Ce-
17-9-H, PERB Dec. No. 730-H at 48 (April 26, 1989), aff’d, 8 Cal. Reptr. 2d 275 (1992) 
(“Research is funded by the University itself or by [an outside] grant . . . .  Research done by 
graduate student contributes to the grant purposes and will often lead to discovery of and 
constitute the core of the student’s dissertation.”). 
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The record here demonstrates that:  (i) the research performed as a research assistant is 
indistinguishable from the research performed for a student’s thesis, Decision at 28; Tr. 72; 116; 
278; 409-10; 662, 775, 801-02, 983; Empl. Ex. 2; and (ii) the research assistants perform the 
same duties in the laboratory as any other students pursuing thesis work; they are funded solely 
to enable them to complete their doctoral degrees, as they would be if they were receiving a 
scholarship.  Tr. 972-73; 1019-20; 1024-25; Empl. Ex. 116.  As in both Leland Stanford and 
NYU I, the financial support received by research assistants does not vary based on the number 
of hours a student spends conducting his or her research or on the results.  As the nature of their 
“services” is identical to the “services” provided in Leland Stanford or NYU I, the General 
Counsel cannot seriously contend that Columbia’s research assistants are employees unless those 
cases are overruled.  There is no basis for reversing Leland Stanford, a decision which has 
withstood more than four decades of changes in Board membership amidst disputes regarding 
the status of other graduate student positions.  Its reasoning remains as sound and well-supported 
today as it was in 1974.10 
V. MASTER’S DEGREE AND UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS ARE 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES 
Petitioner contends that appointment for at least one academic semester is sufficient to 
include Master’s degree and undergraduate students in a bargaining unit, Pet. Br. at 49, but fails 
to explain how such students have any “real continuing interest in the terms and conditions of 
employment offered by the employer.”  Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 306 NLRB 294, 296 (1992).   
                                                 
10 Research Found. of the State Univ. of N.Y. Office of Sponsored Programs, 350 NLRB 197 
(2007), is not relevant because it did not involve graduate research assistants who perform 
dissertation research at their university.  As stated by the Board, “the Employer is not a 
university or college and does not confer degrees or admit students” and it is “not an academic 
institution.”  350 NLRB at 198.  Not surprisingly, the Board found that there was no educational 
relationship between the individuals involved and their employer.  Id.    
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The Board has frequently excluded temporary or casual employees with finite 
termination dates – like hourly-paid student workers – from a bargaining unit because they do 
not have a sufficient interest in the outcome of collective bargaining to participate in the process.  
In Goddard College, 216 NLRB 457 (1975), for example, the Board held that that visiting 
faculty members hired for a definite term of one semester or year were temporary employees.  
Even though visiting faculty members occasionally continued their employment beyond a year, 
and up to 10 percent had been offered permanent positions, the Board excluded all visiting 
faculty from the bargaining unit.  Because Master’s degree and undergraduate students are 
employed for a defined, brief duration of one semester to a year, and have no expectancy of 
continued employment, they should be excluded as temporary employees.  See Trs. of Stevens 
Inst. of Tech., 222 NLRB 16 (1976) (faculty member with a one-year contract is a temporary 
employee, notwithstanding being offered another temporary appointment); Am. Fed. of State, 
Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 224 NLRB 1057, 1058 (1976) (employee with a ninety-day 
contract which could be extended for an additional ninety-days by the employer is a temporary 
employee).           
Petitioner states that “[t]he Board has long recognized that employees hired for a limited 
period of time with a defined endpoint have the right to organize.”  Pet. Br. at 47.  In fact, none 
of the cases cited in its brief support this proposition.  All employees in the cases cited by 
Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of continuing or repeated employment.  In Berlitz Sch. of 
Languages, 231 NLRB 766 (1977), for example, the frequency with which the on-call language 
teachers were assigned depended on the demand for the language they taught and their 
availability.  The teachers, however, remained on the school’s on-call list for years and expected 
that the school would continue to give them assignments as long they were interested.  Similarly, 
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in Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 173 NLRB 1366 (1968), there was no fixed endpoint to the 
assignments of auto-shuttlers who transported cars between the company’s various rental 
facilities in Philadelphia.  They would continuously show up and whenever work was available 
they would be assigned.11  These employees are completely unlike the temporary Master’s 
degree and undergraduate students at Columbia who have assignments for one or two semesters, 
with no expectation of future employment at all.   
VI. DOCTORAL STUDENTS DO NOT SHARE A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 
WITH MASTER’S DEGREE AND UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 
Petitioner acknowledges that “whether undergraduate and Master’s degree students 
should be included in a bargaining unit with doctoral students should be decided according to 
normal community of interest standards.”  Pet. Br. at 43.  Petitioner suggests that the Regional 
Director properly analyzed these factors in determining that a unit of all teaching and research 
assistants would be appropriate.  Id. at 43-44.  The Regional Director’s entire discussion of the 
community of interest factors, however, was comprised of four sentences: 
[D]uring the period [undergraduate and Master’s] students are serving in 
[instructional or research] positions, all of them are performing duties identical or 
nearly identical to doctoral student assistants, often side-by-side with doctoral 
students.  The record includes testimony that to a student’s eye, an undergraduate 
Math Help Room TAIII is indistinguishable from a doctoral student working in 
the Help Room.  Accordingly, undergraduate and Master’s students serving in 
instructional and research positions may share a community of interest with 
doctoral candidates because they are all performing essentially the same work. On 
the other hand, as the Employer emphasizes, it is true that the financial 
compensation to Master’s Degree students and undergraduates in assistant 
positions differs significantly from that provided to doctoral students. 
                                                 
11 The same is true of the “temporary” employees in Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 101 NLRB 1005 
(1952); Hondo Drilling Co., 164 NLRB 416 (1967); Daniel Constr. Co., 133 NLRB 264 (1961).  
Kansas City Repertory Theatre, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 28 (2010), is not to the contrary because 
there was evidence that some employees had “an expectancy of future employment.”  Id. at 1, 
n.4. 
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Dec. at 30.  In other words, the Regional Director considered just two factors – similarity of the 
work and financial compensation – and found that the financial compensation factor weighs 
against including Master’s degree students and undergraduates in the same unit as doctoral 
students.  See Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., 355 NLRB 637, 641 (2010) (describing multiple 
factors).  The Regional Director’s finding as to the similarity of work is plainly refuted by the 
record.  As Columbia explained in its Brief on Review, while there may be some overlap in 
responsibilities, undergraduate and Master’s students perform mostly different functions than 
Ph.D. student assistants.  Columbia Br. at 44-46.  Although doctoral teaching assistants may at 
times perform administrative tasks performed by Master’s degree and undergraduate students, 
their core functions all relate to teaching or training to teach, and are thus more advanced and 
varied.  Decision at 10, 16; Tr. 69-70; 222; 664-65; 889.  The role played by Master’s and 
undergraduate students could not be more dissimilar.  But, even assuming that they performed 
the same work, such a “single element of common interest does not . . . supply a sufficient bond 
to overcome the diversity of interests among employees in this otherwise random group[ ] of 
heterogeneous classifications.”  The Grand, 197 NLRB 1105, 1106 (1972); San Francisco Art 
Inst., 226 NLRB No. 204, at 1252 (1976) (no community of interest even though part-time 
student janitors performed the same job functions as the full-time janitor). 
Petitioner further contends that graduate assistants share a community of interest “by 
virtue of their status as students.”  Pet. Br. at 44.  It is ironic that Petitioner relies on student 
status to define the appropriate unit for bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, 
while at the same time maintaining that student status is irrelevant to determining whether 
graduate assistants are statutory “employees.”  By focusing on their identity as students, 
moreover, the Petitioner fails to discuss the evidence demonstrating that there is no community 
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of interest among the Master's degree and undergraduate students and doctoral students. See 
Columbia Br. at 47-50. The common status of "studenthood" is not sufficient to overcome the 
lack of shared interests. 
Finally, Petitioner's reliance on Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 (1972), is misplaced. 
Adelphi held that graduate student assistants do not belong in the same bargaining unit as faculty. 
Id at 640. The Board looked to community of interest factors related to the different terms and 
conditions of employment between students and faculty members; it did not simply focus on 
student status. 
A proper application of the community of interest test demonstrates that — even if they 
are not excluded altogether as temporary — Master's degree and undergraduate students should 
not be in the same bargaining unit as doctoral students. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition should be dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
March 14, 2016 
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